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What type of controlling investors impact on which elements of 
corporate social responsibility? 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a large sample of 3,541 companies drawn from 30 countries over the period 2002 
to 2010 we analyse the impact of strategic shareholdings on different elements of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that total strategic or closely held equity 
holdings adversely affect the environmental, social and governance scores provided by 
ASSET4. However, this effect is largely driven by entrenched and undiversified holdings 
such as family and corporate cross-holdings whereas diversified institutional investments 
typically have an insignificant impact. The influence of undiversified holdings includes 
particularly strong negative impacts on measures that include climate change, 
environmental management, business ethics and human rights. Thus the impact of 
ownership on CSR performance differs depending on both the type of owner and the 
type of CSR. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Environment; Social; Governance; Human 
Rights; Climate Change; Institutional Investor. 
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What type of controlling investors impact on which elements of 
corporate social responsibility? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent failures of corporate governance, environmental management and social 
responsibility have emphasised the importance of improving the environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) performance of public corporations. Prior results based on 
American (Barnea & Rubin, 2010), European (Dam and Scholtens, 2012) and 
international data (Mackenzie et al., 2011; Rees and Mackenzie, 2011; Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2010) have suggested that such performance is conditioned by ownership. 
These studies suggest that a) entrenched equity holdings reduce ESG performance, b) 
engagement by responsible investment indices improves performance and c) high levels 
of leverage can impact on performance in either direction. While Dam and Scholtens 
(2012) separate corporate social responsibility (CSR) into three broad categories related 
to ethics, stakeholders and environment, none of the above studies investigated which 
underlying elements of environmental, social or governance activities are affected by 
ownership. In this study we seek to identify what types of strategic equity ownership 
impact on which types of CSR1 performance. We assume that owners will tend to resist 
environmental, social and governance improvements if the personal costs exceed the 
benefits from the allocation of resources to ESG projects (Siegel and Vitaliano, 2006; 
Rees and Mackenzie, 2011). We hypothesise that equity held for strategic reasons will 
have a stronger impact on ESG than equity held for trading. We also argue that the 
impact of strategic ownership on ESG will be more pronounced for undiversified 
owners than diversified and more pronounced where the benefits are externally focused.   
 
Using a sample of 3,541 firms drawn from 30 countries over the period 2002 to 2010 we 
analyse the impact of entrenched shareholdings (greater than 20% for overall holdings, 
defined either as strategic or closely held, and over 10% for the sub-categories of 
corporate, family, investment institution or government) on different ESG elements as 
reported by ASSET4. Propensity score matching is used to contrast ESG elements for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!We follow the adaptation by Aguilera et al. (2007) of the definition introduced by Davis (1973) and refer to CSR as 
“the firm’s considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements 
of the firm to accomplish social and environmental benefits along with the traditional economic gains which the firm 
seeks” (Aguilera et al., 2007: 836). While there are many definitions of CSR, this formulation emphasises the potential 
external nature of benefits from CSR initiatives and the relation of CSR to the wealth generating goal of the firm. 
Further, we use ESG and CSR terms as synonyms for the purposes of the discussion in this study.  !
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the treatment firms, i.e. those with significant strategic shareholdings, with the control 
firms, which have the same probability of significant strategic shareholdings but do not 
have such holdings. This approach produces a reliable experimental setting in which to 
evaluate the impact of strategic shareholdings (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Armstrong 
et al., 2010). We additionally examine the relationship using traditional regression analysis 
with strategic shareholdings as independent variables alongside control variables. The 
propensity matching variables and the control variables in the regression models are 
capitalisation, profitability, Tobin’s q, leverage, year, industry and country. 
 
To study the effect of ownership on ESG performance, we use two metrics of overall 
ownership, designated strategic or closely held equity holdings, and separately study 
various groups of block holders such as corporations, employees and families, 
government and investment institutions. We analyse the impact of these groups of 
owners on the ASSET4 pillars of environmental, social and governance scores, and on 
their 15 sub-scores or themes. At the top level, closely held or strategic shareholdings 
adversely affect environmental, social and governance scores. Entrenched undiversified 
shareholdings controlled by families or corporate cross-holdings also have a negative 
effect on all three scores. Conversely, government holdings impact positively on 
environmental and social scores, as do investment trusts on governance. Broadly 
speaking, entrenched undiversified block holdings reduce ESG performance whereas 
block holdings by diversified institutional investors have no effect or a modest benign 
effect.  
 
A more detailed analysis of the underlying themes of ESG performance shows that 
entrenched shareholders have a particularly strong negative impact on ESG themes that 
relate to benefits that fall outside the firm such as business ethics, climate change, 
environmental management and human rights than for those that impact on the firm 
itself such as internal governance, product development, health and safety, employment 
quality and training and development. A strong impact is also found on the overarching 
vision and strategy dimension that “reflects a company‘s capacity to convincingly show 
and communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), social and environmental 
dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes” (ASSET4 definition: see 
appendix one). 
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The results offer an insight into the influence of ownership on ESG performance and 
the way in which institutional arrangements might stimulate ESG investment and affect 
management decision-making. Above all the impact of ownership on ESG depends on 
both the type of owner and the type of ESG. Recent global initiatives such as UN 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), 
Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) and the activities of 
Responsible Investment indices such as FTSE4Good or Dow Jones Sustainability 
Indices have promoted the involvement of shareholders in improving ESG performance 
all over the world. These initiatives predominantly target institutional investors who are 
becoming the dominant shareholders in many countries (Clark and Hebb, 2005; Starks, 
2009). Our results suggest that institutional investors as yet provide little benefit over 
diversified investors and the campaign to improve CSR via institutional investment has 
some way to go before it is effective. However, the greater problem would appear to lie 
with the entrenched undiversified investors who have both the power to influence firm 
decisions and an incentive to reduce investment in CSR that doesn’t benefit the firm 
directly. 
 
 
2. Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
 
2.1 ESG ratings 
 
ASSET4 is one of a growing set of ESG ratings organisations. For some time Kinder, 
Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) have been providing an assessment of the ESG 
performance of US firms. Since 2001 FTSE have also been categorising firms as 
complying or not with ESG criteria to become listed in the FTSE4Good index, and since 
2011 they calculate a performance score based on six categories for each of the 
environmental, social and governance pillars. Despite some early scepticism the 
organisations have gradually refined their techniques and have gained some credibility in 
the financial and investment world (Collison et al., 2009; Slager et al., 2012). In most 
cases financial institutions are closely involved in the development of the scoring 
systems. ASSET4, now a part of the Thomson Reuters organisation, have been 
publishing their scores since 2002 using information from company reports, corporate 
and NGO websites, press and trade publications (Semenova, 2010). They calculate four 
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scores: the usual environmental, social and governance scores plus an economic score. 
The economic score is based on client loyalty, firm performance and shareholder loyalty 
but we do not analyse this pillar as it lies outside the CSR setting. Environmental 
performance incorporates the themes of resource reduction, emission reduction and 
product innovation. Social performance includes employment quality, health and safety, 
training and development, diversity, human rights, community (which includes business 
ethics) and product responsibility. Corporate governance is assessed on board structure, 
compensation policy, board functions, shareholder rights and vision and strategy. A 
description of the categories is given in appendix one. ASSET4 report that these scores 
are based on 250 indicators calculated from 750 publicly available data items.  
 
As with all such scoring systems it is difficult to tell to what extent the score measures 
genuine CSR activity and to what extent that CSR activity benefits stakeholders. Rees and 
Mackenzie (2011) note that in 2011 the FTSE4Good and ASSET4 scores are 
significantly positively correlated. This is consistent with two expert systems evaluating 
the same underlying phenomena. They report the scores for five dimensions and where 
like is being compared with like the raw correlations are marginally over 0.50. Some of 
the remaining disagreement will be explained by explicit differences in the scoring 
systems as FTSE4Good downgrade firms exposed to high risk and ASSET4 do not. 
However, there is a significant level of agreement between the two sets of scores.  
 
There is also some limited American evidence suggesting that ESG scores reflect an 
underlying reality and impact on performance. Chatterji et al. (2009) analyse a KLD 
assessment of 588 firms’ environmental performance and demonstrate that this is related 
to past environmental events such as toxic emissions, environmentally related fines etc. 
The score appears to be a better assessment of past than future performance. However, 
Chatterji and Toffel (2010) have also demonstrated that poor KLD environmental scores 
have stimulated firms to improve their toxic emissions faster than firms that scored well. 
Additionally, Semenova (2010) used a large sample of MSCI US companies in 2003-2008 
and found that environmental performance metrics constructed independently by KLD, 
GES and ASSET4 exhibit a significant correlation when considering both environmental 
performance and environmental risks. The study further reports that these rating services 
offer consistent data for the comparison of companies across industries and thereby 
enable stakeholders to make informed decisions. Thus there is some preliminary 
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evidence that ESG scores can reflect an underlying reality and can lead to genuine 
benefits. There is some way to go before we can conclude that these benefits are 
pervasive.  
2.2 Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
Ownership and ESG performance 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that managers may favour ESG developments. Prior 
research argues that enhanced these practices can offer a competitive advantage (Jones, 
1995; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Aguilera et al., 2006; Kiernan, 2007). ESG developments 
may, for example, send a particular signal to consumers about product quality 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Becker-Olsen et al., 2005), help sustain brand loyalty 
(Siegel and Vitaliano, 2006), attract motivated employees (Moskowitz, 1972; Turban and 
Greening, 1997) and reduce capital constraints (Cheng et al., 2011). Investors may regard 
enhanced corporate social performance as a signal about the overall quality of 
management (Solomon et al., 2004; Renneboog et al., 2008) or as a necessary way to 
avoid costs in case of boycotts (Cespa and Cestone, 2007) and preserve shareholder value 
through goodwill (Godfrey et al., 2009). Jo and Harjoto (2011) argue that their evidence 
is more strongly supportive of the theory that investment CSR is a method for reducing 
conflict with stakeholders, rather than as a signal of product quality or a way of boosting 
management reputation or security of tenure. 
 
More direct attempts to establish the link between financial and social performance using 
various ESG scoring systems and the related responsible investment indices produced 
mixed results (Margolis et al., 2007; Renneboog et al. 2008). If ESG investment is costly 
we might expect firms with high levels of performance to have lower profitability or 
growth. A case has been made that investment in environmental and social management 
and good governance has a positive impact on performance (for example Jo and Harjoto, 
2011b and 2012). Yet it is not clear why over or under social and environmental 
performance should necessarily lead to better financial performance or to abnormal 
returns, unless the market has collectively misunderstood the implications (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2001). If CSR does improve performance then good management will 
undertake CSR investment. Taken together, prior evidence suggests that while ESG 
development may improve some aspects of corporate performance and may therefore be 
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allied with shareholder wealth creation, as yet we have little robust evidence on the 
relationship between ESG scores and financial performance. Further, the existing 
evidence is sensitive to the ESG measures employed. We regard this as an indication that 
the way in which investors on the market perceive and determine CSR and its potential 
implications may not be uniform both across CSR programmes and across groups of 
investors and may therefore affect their investment and governance decisions.  
 
In this study we focus particularly on the source of strategic shareholdings. Prior work 
provided mixed evidence of the association between ESG and closely held stock, with 
Ioannou and Serafeim (2010) reporting a tentative negative association and Mackenzie et 
al. (2011) finding no effect.  Some evidence also shows a negative impact of entrenched 
undiversified equity (Rees and Mackenzie, 2011). The rationale of strategic owners 
regarding ESG is that they bear most of the associated costs because they cannot easily 
exit their position in the company (Cox et al., 2004). At the same time large institutional 
investors and other block holders have both the resources and the incentives to monitor 
management decisions in order to reduce management entrenchment (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). In the case of ESG activities, managers usually have large corporate 
resources at their disposal (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Managers are more likely to over invest 
resources in ESG because of the personal benefits from the ‘warm-glow’ effect, possibly 
leading to agency conflict (Friedman, 1970; Barnea and Rubin, 2010). They have been 
shown to use ESG initiatives as an entrenchment ‘shield’ based on a good image with 
other stakeholders (Cespa and Cestone, 2007, Jo and Harjoto, 2011 and 2012) while, for 
example, engaging in earnings manipulations (Prior et al., 2008). Thus, while prior 
evidence points to the negative association between strategic owners and ESG 
developments, we extend it by predicting that strategic shareholders will try to prevent 
excessive expenditure on ESG activities.  
 
H1: Strategic or closely held shareholdings are associated with lower ESG scores. 
 
While strategic owners are generally unlikely to be enthusiastic about ESG expenditures, 
we may expect a substantial heterogeneity in their actual influence on ESG efforts of the 
companies they invest in. There is evidence to suggest that some institutional investors 
may effectively encourage companies to improve their ESG stance. Mackenzie et al. 
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(2011) show how financial institutions may influence ESG practices in their analysis of 
the impact of FTSE4Good engagement on firms in danger of being deleted from the 
FTSE4Good index when the environmental management criteria were upgraded. They 
conclude that for an international sample of firms FTSE4Good engagement significantly 
increased the probability of meeting the new criteria when implemented in 2005. 
Adopting a different approach, Cox et al. (2004) examine the impact of CSR 
performance on the demand for equity from different categories of institutional 
investors. Their evidence suggests that for a UK sample of FTSE All-Share index 
constituents during 2002-2003 long-term institutional investors, pension funds and life 
assurance firms tend to invest in firms with high CSR ranks but charities, short-term 
investors, investment trusts and unit trusts do not. Although based on UK data only, this 
suggests that the direction of causality is not obvious and that the link between CSR and 
investment institutions may be complex.  
 
Large diversified owners such as pension funds are thought to be directly exposed to the 
impact of ESG developments through their long-term commitment to their clients 
(Sethi, 2005). Further, as strategic investors their holdings are susceptible to the 
consequences of any ESG negligence resulting in fines, negative publicity and other 
pressures from stakeholders (Johnson and Greening, 1999). As noted by Sethi (2005), in 
a discussion of US funds, a more conventional approach to the pension funds’ fiduciary 
duty suggests that they should narrowly focus on well-defined financial measures to 
assess their investments. However, more recent evidence argues that pension funds 
would not resist ESG expenditures for future long-term benefits such as improved 
working conditions of the population and the long-term growth of corporations and 
whole industries. As Sethi (2005) argues, financial intermediaries advising pension funds 
on investment may be biased towards short-term investment considerations, therefore 
pension funds would have to actively promote ESG considerations. There is evidence 
showing that some of the largest pension funds such as ABP or the Government 
Pension Fund Global actively encourage ESG programmes both via engagement and 
investment decisions (Kiernan, 2007; Renneboog et al., 2008). Although these funds 
demonstrate impressive progress in stimulating ESG initiatives in companies, it remains 
unclear whether pension funds as a group of strategic owners would actively impact ESG 
decisions in companies. 
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The state has a responsibility to improve the quality of the life of the population and 
stimulate innovation, and may be inclined to incorporate addressing environmental and 
social challenges into its ownership strategy (OECD, 2010). Concentrated family 
ownership has been shown to significantly impact the corporation both in positive and 
negative ways. Family shareholdings have been shown to be positively correlated with 
corporate performance, particularly so when family members are involved in 
management (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Andres, 2008). 
Conversely, family members may use their control to follow their private agenda and 
neglect the interests of other shareholders (Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Jara-Bertín et al., 
2008) and therefore foster a negative corporate reputation (Delgado-García et al., 2010).  
 
Using FTSE4Good ESG Ratings, Rees and Mackenzie (2011) showed that undiversified 
entrenched block holders are associated with lower ESG performance while pension 
funds or governments are not. The authors argue that the result is consistent for both the 
overall ESG rating and separately for corporate governance, environmental management, 
human rights, climate change and countering bribery areas. Dam and Scholtens (2012) 
find that ownership by corporations, employees and individuals in European 
multinational companies is negatively correlated with corporate social policies while bank 
shareholdings, institutional and government ownership show no significant association. 
While these findings provide initial evidence as to which types of owners tend to 
promote or discourage ESG, it still remains unclear which ESG elements are favoured or 
opposed by different groups of block holders. We address this issue further in this study 
but first, to ensure comparability of our analysis with prior evidence, we perform a direct 
test of whether undiversified strategic owners are associated with lower ESG scores than 
diversified strategic shareholders. We form the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Undiversified strategic shareholdings (family and corporations) are associated with lower ESG 
scores than other shareholdings (investment institutions and government). 
 
Ownership impact on different ESG areas 
 
The previous section considers the impact of different types of equity holders on ESG in 
general. We now extend prior work to investigate which specific ESG initiatives would 
be promoted or discouraged by which groups of owners and why this could be the case. 
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Concentrated ownership and power in the hands of block holders can increase their 
influence over corporate activities in order to extract private benefits (La Porta et al., 
2000) possibly at the expense of minority shareholders or other groups of stakeholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Above all, this suggests that large owners may influence the 
management to take on activities that, in the owner’s view, maximise the value of their 
shareholdings. The rational motivation of the owner is ultimately based on the expected 
return (Clark and Hebb, 2005; Lydenberg, 2007). Therefore, we hypothesise that owners 
will promote those environmental, social and governance programmes that they perceive 
to be in their interest. That is, the benefits for the owners exceed the costs from the 
allocation of resources to ESG development (Siegel and Vitaliano, 2006; Rees and 
Mackenzie, 2011). In this case, we expect significant differences in the interests of 
owners with regards to different aspects of ESG performance. Indeed, survey findings by 
Mercer Consulting in 2006 suggest that 64% of investors acknowledged the importance 
of corporate governance while 26% considered human rights and only 7% included 
climate change issues in their investment decisions (Starks, 2009).  
 
We attribute these differences to the distribution of costs and benefits of investment in 
various ESG activities. From this perspective, this paper responds to the calls of prior 
research to investigate different dimensions of environmental, social and governance 
practices by firms separately rather than as an aggregate metric (Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Cox et al., 2004; Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Godfrey et 
al., 2008; Dam and Scholtens, 2012). For example, Johnson and Greening (1999) divided 
CSR in the ‘people’ dimension of corporate social performance related to communities 
and employees, and the ‘product quality’ dimension concerned with production and 
environmental strategy. However, the distribution of associated costs and derived gains is 
not explicit in these two categories, nor in the classification used by Dam and Scholtens 
(2012) who distinguished between ESG issues related to stakeholders, ethics and 
environment. Barnea and Rubin (2010) analyse 2,292 US firms categorised as socially 
responsible or irresponsible in 2003 by KLD. With regards to costs and benefits of ESG, 
Rees and Mackenzie (2011) classify ESG areas in three categories: predominantly 
externally focused (environmental management and climate change), concerned with firm 
contacts (human rights, supply chain labour standards and anti-bribery measures) and 
mainly focused on internal matters (corporate governance). In line with this classification, 
while some CSR initiatives targeting internal improvements (such as relations with 
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employees or product quality), are shown to be associated with higher firm value, the 
evidence regarding the value enhancing potential of more external CSR (related to the 
wider community and the environment) is mixed (Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 
2012). 
 
In this study, we use ASSET4 ESG elements and extend Rees and Mackenzie’s (2011) 
classification by distinguishing between the ESG programmes according to the extent to 
which strategic owners can be expected to benefit from them. By approaching the wide 
array of CSR initiatives from the narrow angle of the owners’ costs and benefits, this 
categorisation enriches our understanding as to how different shareholders perceive 
different CSR engagements of the firm. Further, it helps to explain why, for example, 
some studies report a positive association between institutional ownership and composite 
CSR (Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011) while others find no relationship 
(Dam and Scholtens, 2012). It may also provide more clarity as to why there is mixed 
evidence of the value-enhancing effect of external CSR as the scope to internalise the 
benefits from CSR activities may differ with different types of large shareholders. 
appendix one briefly describes the ASSET4 themes used to assess the three categories. 
We classify ESG developments as follows.  
 
• Governance-related practices offering largely internal benefits to shareholders: board 
function, board structure, compensation policy and shareholder rights. Diversified 
shareholders may view these positively whereas undiversified block holders might prefer 
the freedom of action allowed by low levels of internal governance. ASSET4 include 
vision and strategy in their governance pillar but we leave this theme aside as it is too 
general to be able to reliably predict where the costs and benefits might fall. 
• Externally orientated practices where the benefits may fall broadly outside the firm: 
resource reduction, emission reduction, community activities and human rights. 
• Initiatives that impact on the firms’ business practices or on their relationship with 
contacts such as suppliers, employees or customers: employment quality, health and 
safety programmes, training and development, diversity of opportunities, product 
innovation and product responsibility. 
 
This classification suggests that governance provisions and to a lesser extent ‘contact’ 
issues may offer a compelling business case for strategic owners and will therefore be 
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overall regarded positively. However, issues such as climate change and human rights, 
which have a substantial social impact, may offer the least immediate internal benefits to 
the strategic shareholders. Here the benefits are perceived as affecting both society at 
large and various groups of stakeholders, but perhaps not shareholders explicitly or, if so, 
then only after a very long time (Cox et al., 2004). Additionally, climate change and 
human rights present issues which still lack a full understanding of the risks involved, 
possible technologies and policy solutions even though the short-term costs of changing 
costs structure and competitive positions of carbon-intensive sectors are more apparent 
(Mackenzie and Ascui, 2009). In this case shareholders are unlikely to promote such ESG 
aspects (Sullivan and Mackenzie, 2007). For comparative purposes we analyse the 
traditional ESG classification alongside our classification based on the location of the 
benefits. For this analysis we have no predicted ranking of impact: 
 
H3a: The negative impact of strategic or closely held shareholdings differs across environmental, social 
score and governance scores. 
 
However, we expect strategic owners to resist those ESG areas that offer them the least 
in terms of direct benefits: 
 
H3b: Strategic or closely held shareholdings impact more strongly on ESG practices with external 
benefits (resource reduction, human rights, community and emission reduction) than those with benefits to 
business practices or contacts (employment quality, diversity of opportunities, health and safety 
programmes, employee training and product innovation) and internal benefits (board function, board 
structure, compensation policy and shareholder rights). 
 
Having proposed a varying impact of different shareholdings on ESG and a varying 
impact of generic shareholdings on different ESG we further hypothesise that the impact 
of shareholdings on external, internal or contact based ESG will differ according to the 
type of ownership. There is an emerging argument suggesting that for large owners such 
as pension funds, the external benefits of certain ESG issues including climate change are 
largely internalised because, as ‘universal’ owners, they have a stake in the global 
economy and are therefore affected by global economic development (Clark and Hebb, 
2005; Gjessing and Syse, 2007; Kiernan, 2007; Sullivan and Mackenzie, 2007). Further, 
some large investors may be exposed to particular markets, such as emerging markets, 
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and may therefore regard it as part of their fiduciary duty to screen companies to avoid 
reputational risks (Clark and Hebb, 2005). In some instances, however, investment banks 
and mutual funds that cannot easily exit the company may be constrained by more short-
term interest (Aguilera et al., 2007) and perceived fiduciary duties (Aguilera et al., 2006) 
and may be only interested in those initiative which provide rapid internal gains such as 
internal governance. Prior research has demonstrated that institutional investors consider 
different aspects of corporate governance to be important for shareholder value creation 
(McCahery et al., 2009). These may include managerial ownership, transparency of 
holdings by large shareholders, equity-based compensation and board independence. The 
involvement of institutional owners has in many instances produced positive outcomes 
for corporate performance (e.g. Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Cornett et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2007; Becht et al., 2008; Del Guercio et al., 2008). Large institutional 
ownership is found to be associated with improvements in executive compensation 
practice (Hartzell and Starks, 2003), fewer instances of earnings manipulation (Chung et 
al., 2002), a reduced cost of debt (Elyasiani et al., 2010) and investment in R&D (Wahal 
and McConnell, 2000).  
 
Generally, since portfolios of large institutional block holders and pension funds tend to 
be highly diversified, these owners may still be more enthusiastic about the potential 
advantages of advanced environmental and social performance and efficient governance. 
Undiversified shareholders such as corporations and families may have a complex nexus 
of financial, private and strategic motives regarding the companies they own and a higher 
exposure to the particular risks involved. Therefore they may be expected to focus more 
on those management programmes from which they have most to gain. Given the 
concentrated character of their shareholdings, these owners have substantial control over 
management decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Andres, 2008). We could therefore 
expect that, on average, diversified strategic owners will exhibit relatively less resistance 
to ESG expenditures than undiversified owners, particularly with regards to those ESG 
programmes that offer the most internal benefits: 
 
H4: Undiversified strategic shareholdings (family and corporations) are most strongly associated with 
lower ESG scores than other shareholdings (investment institutions and government) where those scores 
relate to external benefits and least strongly for internal benefits. 
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3. Research Method 
 
We use propensity score matching as our main method of analysis. It is more 
conventional to use regression analysis with control variables but this will only effectively 
control for exogenous influences if the relationship between the control variables and the 
dependent variable are linear and the same for both the treated sample, firms with 
strategic shareholdings, and the untreated, those without (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Armstrong et al. 2010). As we do not know the underlying 
relationship between the controls and the ESG scores, and we suspect that these may 
well differ across treated and untreated firms, we argue that propensity score matching 
should be more reliable. We replicate our propensity score results with regression 
analysis and indeed find that the regression approach produces more apparently 
statistically significant results. We argue that it is prudent to use the more conservative 
approach and note that for some of the regression results the implied impact of 
treatment is somewhat larger than the difference between the two groups. The control 
variables have exacerbated, not mitigated, the difference between the treated and 
untreated groups. 
 
3.1 Propensity Score Matching. 
 
Equation one is used to estimate a probability that a firm will be identified as receiving 
treatment i.e. categorised as having a significant overall strategic equity holding (more 
than 20%) or a significant constituent holding (over 10%).  In equation one TRTit 
represents the zero-one variable where one indicates that the case receives treatment and 
zero that it does not. Control variables are percentiles of a) market capitalisation b) 
return on equity c) of the market value of equity plus debt over book value of equity plus 
debt and c) book value of dept to book value of equity plus debt. The year, country and 
industry variables are a vector of dummies identifying each firm’s membership of each 
category (see appendix two for the distribution of the sample). The equation is estimated 
as a probit model (Leuven and Sianesi 2010). It may also be estimated as a logit model 
but in this case the results for probit or logit estimation are virtually indistinguishable. 
 
Equation 1: TRTit = a0 +a1MCit + a2ROEit + a3TQit + a4LEVit +… 
YR!it y + CO!itc + IND!iti + eit 
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The model has been tested in a number of different specifications. The treatment 
variable TRTit is a dummy variable indicating if the measure of strategic holdings 
provided by Thomson Reuters, Datastream, which ranges from 0 to 100, is greater than 
20% in the case of overall strategic holdings or greater than 10% for classifications of 
strategic holdings. Thomson Reuters classify investors as strategic or otherwise, and 
where a strategic investor holds more than 5% of equity this is treated as a strategic 
holding. Given the complexity of the data gathering involved there is some scope for 
strategic holdings to be under assessed and the reported statistic may be approximate. 
For this reason we simply define a holding of greater than 10% for a single class, or 20% 
for the total strategic holding, as being a significant. There may be firms in our analysis 
with reported strategic holdings of less than 10% with real holdings greater than that but 
this would bias our results against a significant finding.  
 
The computation of the strategic shareholding changed at the end of 2004. Previously all 
equity holdings by organisations identified as strategic investors were recorded whereas 
after 2005 only holdings of 5% or more were considered. Where this resulted in 
cumulating across different strategic shareholdings, as with the total strategic holding or 
the institutional holding this caused a significant shift in the recorded number. To ensure 
consistency we restrict the analysis to 2005-2010 for these definitions and supplement 
the analysis with the Thomson Reuters closely held equity definition which is consistently 
available for 2002-2010. This measure is highly correlated with the strategic shareholding 
estimate over the period 2005-2010 and produces very similar results for that period. The 
restriction of the period to 2005-2010 and the diversified nature of pension fund 
stockholdings limited the sample for pension funds producing unreliable results. 
Therefore the analysis has been limited to closely held, strategic, corporate, family and 
institutional holdings.  
 
The leverage variable LEVit is expressed in percentiles to avoid the need to trim outliers. 
The results are robust to using the raw data if outliers are removed. The underlying 
leverage variable has been calculated as total debt over total debt plus equity and 
expressed as a percentile of the sample. Return on equity, ROEit, also expressed as a 
percentile, was replaced by return on assets with no clear impact on the results. Our 
estimate of Tobins Q, the book value of debt plus the market value of equity over the 
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book value of debt plus equity, is intended to measure growth opportunities and is 
expressed as a percentile. The results are robust to the replacement of this variable by 
market-to-book. The country, Cit, industry, Iit, and year, YRit, dummy variables identify 
each industry, country and year as specified in appendix one.  
 
The cases that received treatment, i.e. TRTit equals one, are then matched with a case, or 
a sample of cases, that did not receive treatment but where the probability of being 
classified as treated is approximately similar, defined as pr(TRT),Y ≈ pr(TRT),N, where 
pr(PRT) is the predicted value from equation two. The treatment effect is then the 
difference in the ESG score being analysed (ESGit) between the two cases. ESGit is one 
of the social, environmental or governance pillars provided by ASSET4 for firm i year t. 
We also calculate 15 constituent themes that are the average of all elements used to 
calculate an ASSET4 pillar for which comprehensive data is available. The ESG variable 
is a score from 0 to 100. 
 
There are a number of ways in which cases may be matched and the statistical 
significance of the treatment effect estimated (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008). The 
results reported in this paper are based on matching each treatment case with 5 
neighbours, with replacement, that fall within a range of probability (calliper) which we 
set at 0.0001 and using the normal T-test of difference between two matched samples 
(Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008; Leuven and Sianesi, 2010). Matching was also conducted 
using different groups of neighbours, n=1 n=3 and n=5, and matching within a radius of 
probabilities (r=0.001, r=0.0005, r=0.0001). A bootstrapping approach was used to 
compute alternative tests of significance. The choice of method involves a certain 
amount of judgement but experiment revealed that the results are not sensitive to the 
number of firms included in the match but are quite sensitive to the decisions that affect 
the number of firms which are considered “off support” and excluded from the analysis. 
These are treatment firms for which no close match can be found which is essentially 
determined by the size of the calliper. Using a tight calliper rejects some treated firms for 
which no adequate match can be found. In practice this rejects some firms for which a 
high probability of treatment is predicted. Our choice reflects a relatively conservative 
approach as broader callipers tended to produce stronger statistical significance although 
the main conclusions were unchanged.  
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3.2 Regression models 
 
We also present regression results based on a pooled time-series and cross-sectional 
sample of international firms where country and industry differences are accounted for 
by including dummies to account for year, industry and country differences and adjusting 
the estimate of standard errors for firm specific clustering. The variable definition is as 
for equation one. As the model is estimated as a pooled cross-section and time-series, 
standard errors are corrected for clustering by firm. 
 
Equation 2: ESGit = b0 +b1TRTit +b2MCit + b3ROEit + b4TQit + b5LEVit +… 
YR!it y + CO!itc + IND!iti + eit 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as for the propensity score analysis and 
the statistical significance is estimated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
Unlike the propensity score the regression approach is not subject to judgemental 
choices regarding the sample. This can mean that the regression is extended across 
heterogeneous cases when it might be wiser to restrict the experimental setting.  
 
3.3 Sample Description 
 
Appendix two, panels 1, 2 and 3 detail the sample composition by year, industry and 
country. We included all cases for which Thomson Reuters’ Datastream service included 
ESG measures, the necessary financial variables and ownership data. The full sample 
comprises 18,690 cases, including 3,541 different firms, spanning 2002 to 2010 with a 
gradual increase in sample size most notably from 2003 to 2004. In some results we used 
a smaller sample due to inconsistency of the strategic shareholding and investment 
institution shareholding prior to 2005. We adopt a broad industry definition and find that 
the firms are very diverse and that there is considerable difference between the average 
scores for industry and country. More detailed industry definitions are available but left 
the analysis unchanged when tested the sensitivity of the results to industry definition. 
The sample is largely, but not exclusively drawn from countries with developed capital 
markets. If we restricted the analysis to firms from such countries the results were 
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essentially unchanged. The sample of firms from countries with less developed capital 
markets is too small to reliably analyse separately. 
 
In appendix three we report the cross-correlation between the main variables and their 
descriptive statistics. Correlations are typically low apart from the environmental and 
social scores (0.752) and the closely held, strategic and corporate measures of 
shareholding (ranging from 0.401 to 0.504) although in no instance are these measures 
used in the sample model. As the ESG variables are expressed as a score out of 100, the 
financial variables are calculated as percentiles and the ownership measures are zero-one 
dummies the analysis is not troubled by outliers. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Propensity Score Matching Results 
 
In table one we report the average unmatched ESG scores for firms with strategic 
shareholdings (the treated) contrasted with those without (the control firms) the 
difference between the two, the standard error and the t-statistic. On the second line for 
each measure of ESG the same average ESG score for the treated firms is compared 
with the score for the propensity score matched control group to calculate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The mean difference, standard error and t-statistic 
is again reported. Where the difference for the ATT is statistically significant at 5 percent 
or better the mean difference and t-statistic are in bold. The matching of treatment and 
control cases is conducted using a probit model the results of which are given in 
appendix four. Although we conducted extensive sensitivity analysis the reported results 
are base on matching treatment cases against the five nearest neighbours by probability 
of treatment, with replacement. Where five neighbours cannot be identified within a 
probability range of plus or minus 0.0001 the case is considered off support and 
discarded. This approach proves to be a relatively conservative analysis identifying fewer 
instances of significant results than other options. 
 
Table one about here 
 
! 19!
We find that both the total strategic or closely held shareholdings of greater than 20% are 
associated with significantly lower environmental, social and governance scores. For 
these overall tests the impact on governance appears to be somewhat higher than on 
environmental or social scores. This is repeated for both corporate and family holdings 
of greater than 10% but in these cases the impact across the three measures looks relative 
undifferentiated. It is worth noting that the considerable impact on ESG of corporate 
holdings approximates to 4 percentage points and that of family holdings to between 6 
and 7 percentage points. The other significant results are that government holdings of 
greater than 10% are positively associated with environmental and social scores and 
investment institution holdings of greater than 10% are positively associated with 
governance scores. 
 
H1: Strategic or closely held shareholdings are associated with lower ESG scores.  
Our results suggest that both strategic and closely held shareholdings are significantly 
negatively associated with environmental, social and governance CSR performance. We 
also averaged the three pillar scores and tested the direction of impact. The result is 
significantly for the three scores and the average score for both measures of concentrated 
ownership and we are therefore able to reject the null of the first hypothesis. While 
managers may extract personal benefits from ESG projects (Barnea and Rubin, 2010), 
strategic owners on average will resist over investment in CSR since their benefits from it 
may be rather distant while the costs may be substantial.   
 
H2: Undiversified strategic shareholdings (family and corporations) are associated with lower ESG 
scores than other shareholdings (investment institutions and government). 
To formally test the second hypothesis we restrict the sample to firms with strategic 
holdings for corporations, families, investment institutions and government and test 
whether firms with the either family or corporate holdings have worse ESG performance 
than the other firms. This is significantly so for the average ESG measure and all three 
pillars and is repeated if we leave firms with government holdings out of the analysis. We 
are therefore able to reject the null of the second hypothesis. The results are consistent 
with the prior evidence suggesting that some institutional investors, pension funds and 
the state may be more enthusiastic about ESG developments (Kiernan, 2007; Renneboog 
et al., 2008; Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Mackenzie et al., 2011) or at least not actively opposed 
to it (Rees and Mackenzie, 2011; Dam and Scholtens, 2012). Meanwhile, families, as well 
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as corporations, are able to use their power to advance their personal agenda (Barontini 
and Caprio, 2006; Jara-Bertín et al., 2008) and in this case restrict ESG activities in firms.  
 
H3a: The negative impact of strategic or closely held shareholdings differs across environmental, social 
score and governance scores. 
With regards to hypothesis 3a we find that the response of governance scores is larger 
than that of both environmental and social scores. Whether estimated using closely held 
ownership for the period 2002-2010 or strategic holdings for the period 2005-2010 we 
find that the impact on governance is statistically significantly greater than that on either 
the environmental or social scores. Thus we can reject the null of hypothesis 3a. 
However, we will later show that this is a result of mixing the impact on undiversified 
entrenched holdings with the very different results for government and investment 
institutions. 
 
 
4.1 Regression Analysis Results 
 
Table two contains the results of regression models of the ESG scores with zero-one 
dummy variables identifying strategic shareholdings and control variables defined as the 
percentile of market capitalisation, return on equity, leverage and Tobin’s Q plus 
unreported dummies identifying year, country and industry membership. Standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Where the coefficient on the treatment 
variable is statistically significant at 5 percent or less the coefficient and t-statistic are 
shown as bold. In all instances where the propensity score matching approach identified 
a statistically significant relationship the regression analysis confirms that. In two 
additional cases the regression analysis suggests a statistically significant difference 
between the ESG scores of the treated and control firms. The regression approach 
suggests that significant holdings by investment institutions have a significant positive 
impact on environmental and social scores whereas these results are insignificant for 
propensity score matching.  
 
 
Table two about here 
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We have not investigated the reason for the differing results between the regression and 
propensity score matching approaches. As there is good reason to suppose that the 
regression approach may not effectively control for the differences between the firms 
and the propensity score-matching approach is the more conservative, we regard the 
regression model results as only supporting those of propensity score matching. 
 
4.3 The impact of strategic ownership on ESG component themes. 
 
Table three reports the impact on the individual ESG theme scores of strategic 
shareholdings or closely held equity overall and those of corporations, families, 
investment institutions and government. We also present these results in graphical form 
in figure one where the estimated treatment effect is shown for the 15 themes and for six 
categories of ownership. Those themes classified as having mainly external benefits are 
shown in as black, those impacting on business contacts as grey and those with internal 
benefits are in white. The fifteenth category, vision and strategy, is shown to the right of 
each cluster and is grey.  
 
Table three and figure one about here 
 
Both closely held equity and strategic holdings, despite the different source of the data 
and years over which the results have been estimated, have a statistically significant 
negative impact on all themes baring product innovation, which is negative but 
insignificant. Neither the tabulated nor graphical results suggest any clear dominance of 
the impact on ESG themes designated external versus internal or versus contacts. These 
results are stronger for the firms with significant corporate holdings and marginally 
stronger again for family holdings and again all estimates save those concerning product 
innovation are statistically significant. Conversely, no overall robust impact on the fifteen 
elements of ESG can be identified for government holdings nor for investment 
institutions. Only the negative impact of investment holdings on diversity and 
opportunity and the positive impact on board structure are statistically significant. 
 
H3b: Strategic or closely held shareholdings impact more strongly on ESG practices with external 
benefits (resource reduction, human rights, community and emission reduction) than those with benefits to 
business practices or contacts (employment quality, diversity of opportunities, health and safety 
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programmes, employee training and product innovation) and internal benefits (board function, board 
structure, compensation policy and shareholder rights). 
The difference in the results across type of owner illustrates the difficulties inherent in 
analysing the impact of total strategic or closely held ownership. When we examine the 
impact of either closely held, for the period 2002-2010, or strategic holdings, for the 
period 2005-2010, on the different themes clustered to represent external, business 
contact or internal benefits we find a negative impact on each theme but no reliable 
difference between the clusters. The only significant result is a marginally significantly 
higher impact on internal themes than business contacts for the closely held treatment 
group. This significant result is not replicated when we substitute strategic holdings for 
closely held. Therefore our results are not consistent with hypothesis H3b.  
 
H4: Undiversified strategic shareholdings (family and corporations) are most strongly associated with 
lower ESG scores than other shareholdings (investment institutions and government) where those scores 
relate to external benefits and least strongly for internal benefits. 
However, when we examine the firms with corporate or family block-holdings a subtle 
but statistically significant pattern appears. The categories of ESG we have classified as 
external tend to have higher negative responses to undiversified owners than other 
categories in general. Thus across corporate and family controlled firms emission 
reduction is the 4th and 3rd most significant impact respectively, resource reduction is the 
largest impact in both cases, community is ranked 10th and 5th, whilst human rights is 5th 
and 12th. Taken together the external impact group has a statistically higher response to 
corporate or family ownership than the internal or business contact group. This is 
statistically significant for the family and corporations taken together and for family 
separately. This difference is not apparent when the impact of total strategic or closely 
held ownership is analysed.  
 
Thus our results confirm hypothesis H4 and we are able to reject the null. This is 
consistent with large undiversified owners assessing potential ESG involvement of the 
companies with regards to the benefits that they may accumulate from it. While a clear 
case is presented in the literature as to why ‘universal’ owners should be interested in 
overall ESG enhancement (Kiernan, 2007) including such global issues as mitigating 
corporate impact on climate change or assuring human rights, our results suggest that 
these ‘external’ initiatives, despite their undoubted significance for the society in general, 
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are actively and effectively discouraged by large undiversified owners given their power 
over management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Andres, 2008). Considering the dominance 
of such ownership in a number of countries, this is a significant contribution to the 
understanding the ways to promote corporate involvement in climate change-related 
activities and human rights provision.   
 
 
These findings could both confirm the first hypothesis and the tendency of strategic 
owners in general to view any CSR expenditure as excessive and a source of managerial 
entrenchment (Barnea and Rubin, 2010) and, combined with the findings of the second 
hypothesis, emphasise the importance of distinguishing between both sources of strategic 
ownership and types of CSR depending on the associated costs and benefits for the 
owners since this is the characteristics which matters for the owners. The latter has not 
been researched in the prior work which analysed either different types of owners versus 
overall CSR (or types not showing distribution of costs and benefits) or the firm value 
impact of different CSR. The results detailed above demonstrate that simultaneous 
differentiation between owners and ESG engagements may shed more light on the 
impact of ownership on CSR and help address the mixed evidence present in prior 
literature such as, for example, regarding the impact of institutional investors (Harjoto 
and Jo, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Dam and Scholtens, 2012).  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Whilst many aspects of corporate social responsibility such as product development or 
governance may be consistent with shareholder wealth maximisation, these are relatively 
uncontroversial if effective management ensures appropriate levels of investment. 
Elements of ESG expenditure which impact on the firm’s contacts including suppliers, 
customers and employees may be perceived as beneficial for investors. There remains the 
possibility that managers will, from the point of view of equity investors, over-invest in 
these types of activities. However, certain ESG improvements are in the interests of 
society in general and here it is difficult to argue that the firm’s shareholders will benefit, 
unless it is by a simple reputational effect. At the same time, these ESG initiatives will 
involve incurring costs within the firm and these can be substantial and involve 
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restructuring and the competitive rebalancing of the whole industries. We suggest that 
these developments are likely to include such issues as climate change mitigation 
strategies and human rights and community provisions. Despite their substantial social 
and economic impact, these may not present a compelling business case for the owners 
but managers may still pursue such developments for the personal benefit of positioning 
themselves as good global citizens.  
 
Shareholders, unlike managers, are likely to be unenthusiastic and possibly hostile to 
activities that reduce the value of their shareholdings or where the potential benefits are 
distant. Therefore, the way that large shareholders influence ESG developments in 
companies, particularly the ones with no immediate internal benefits, is a crucial question 
in understanding the ESG stance of companies. In this paper we revisit the question of 
the impact of different strategic equity holders on ESG performance using a large 
internationally distributed sample and employing propensity score matching to overcome 
some of the shortcomings of regression modelling. 
 
Since strategic owners ultimately bear the costs associated with ESG activities and given 
the long-term nature of their holdings, they are likely to step forward and resist 
undesirable expenditures by management. The larger their shareholding, the more power 
strategic shareholders will have to influence management and the less diversified their 
shareholding the stronger their incentive to do so. Indeed, highly diversified shareholders 
such as investment institutions may gain from the beneficial impact of ESG expenditure 
on other firms and society as a whole, while investors such as pension funds and the 
government itself have a clear interest in social benefits. While this may not result in 
these owners necessarily actively promoting ESG improvements, they are less likely to 
actively resist them. 
 
Our results confirm that undiversified block holders are associated with lower 
environmental, social and governance performance, that government holdings are 
associated with better environmental and social performance and that diversified 
shareholders such as investment institutions have little impact on ESG either way. This 
last result may be unexpected given the movement towards socially responsible 
investment and the reported success of investor engagement. However, an important 
implication of this result suggests that if managers have reason to take a generally 
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positive attitude towards ESG expenditure, in the absence of direct opposition from 
shareholders they may invest more in ESG. We may therefore generally regard this 
implication as moderately beneficial for ESG development. 
 
We also investigate the differing impact of strategic stockholdings on different types of 
ESG performance. Particularly, we argue that emission reduction, resource reduction, 
business ethics (classified in community by ASSET4) and human rights are all instances 
where a significant element of the benefit from the investment may fall outside the firm. 
In all four cases the performance measures are significantly and negatively associated 
with undiversified strategic or closely held shareholdings. This negative impact is 
generally stronger when we restrict the controlling shareholdings to corporations of 
families and in this instance we are able to show that the impact is statistically 
significantly larger on these ESG classifications with external benefits than for other 
ESG. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by offering a more nuanced view of 
the differing impact of ownership on different ESG issues. In particular, we demonstrate 
how the strategic owners may inhibit investment in global issues such as climate change 
and human rights and identify which type of owners are likely to have stronger 
resistance. Without a detailed understanding as to which groups of owners effectively 
curb ESG investments, mainstreaming considerations of such issues as climate change 
and human rights among investors and companies is likely to be hard if not futile. 
 
Given that environmental, social and governance underperformance of firms may have 
massive social costs it is important to consider the implications of our analysis. Policy 
makers may wish to consider the advantages of encouraging diversified share ownership, 
either directly or via investment institutions, and there also seem to be benefits from 
direct government equity holdings. Where firms have substantial undiversified 
shareholdings, policy makers might consider either more robust controls or targeted 
incentives to encourage environmental, social and governance improvements.  
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Table 1. Propensity Score Matching Test of ESG Pillar Performance 
  Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference T-stat 
Close ENV Unmatched 48.540 50.428 -1.888 -3.93 
CTL 9,285  ATT 49.707 51.953 -2.246 -3.18 
TRT 5,596 SOC Unmatched 46.916 51.957 -5.040 -10.91 
OS 2,830  ATT 47.923 50.676 -2.753 -4.06 
TOT 17,711 GOV Unmatched 40.054 64.605 -24.551 -59.66 
2002-10  ATT 45.310 52.110 -6.800 -11.07 
Strategic ENV Unmatched 46.834 51.993 -5.159 -9.69 
CTL 8,793  ATT 46.035 49.156 -3.121 -4.42 
TRT 4,396 SOC Unmatched 47.865 51.003 -3.138 -6.11 
OS 1,735  ATT 46.212 49.081 -2.869 -4.22 
TOT 14,928 GOV Unmatched 46.885 56.927 -10.041 -20.4 
2005-10  ATT 51.331 56.301 -4.970 -7.62 
Corp. ENV Unmatched 50.159 49.403 0.756 1.27 
CTL 14,817  ATT 50.399 54.095 -3.696 -4.45 
TRT 2,775 SOC Unmatched 48.769 49.869 -1.099 -1.91 
OS 792  ATT 48.073 52.114 -4.041 -4.97 
TOT 18,364 GOV Unmatched 35.039 56.920 -21.881 -40.86 
2002-10  ATT 36.194 40.845 -4.652 -6.09 
Family ENV Unmatched 42.335 50.312 -7.978 -9.93 
CTL 16,615  ATT 42.567 49.039 -6.472 -6.79 
TRT 1,537 SOC Unmatched 44.316 50.210 -5.894 -7.60 
OS 212  ATT 44.052 50.965 -6.912 -7.40 
TOT 18,364 GOV Unmatched 41.667 53.861 -12.194 -16.29 
2002-10  ATT 43.436 49.985 -6.549 -7.33 
Gov. ENV Unmatched 70.175 48.931 21.243 13.85 
CTL 16,243  ATT 69.189 63.010 6.179 2.48 
TRT 214 SOC Unmatched 71.553 48.596 22.957 15.57 
OS 227  ATT 70.123 64.146 5.977 2.43 
TOT 16,684 GOV Unmatched 47.187 52.914 -5.727 -3.93 
2002-10  ATT 45.271 47.237 -1.966 -0.83 
Inv. ENV Unmatched 44.246 52.360 -8.113 -14.35 
CTL 1,321  ATT 46.577 45.557 1.020 1.28 
TRT 3,692 SOC Unmatched 46.670 51.038 -4.368 -7.98 
OS 896  ATT 48.493 47.671 0.822 1.08 
TOT 14,909 GOV Unmatched 65.180 47.336 17.844 34.87 
2005-10  ATT 64.231 62.829 1.402 2.03 
The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) where treatment is 
defined as closely held (Close) or strategic (Strategic) equity holdings greater than 20% and 
equity holdings of greater than 10% for the components: corporations (Corp.), family 
holdings (Family), government (Gov.) and investment institutions’ (Inv.). The treated firms 
are matched with their closest 5 untreated neighbours falling within a calliper of 0.0001 as 
estimated using the probit model in equation 1. The number of firms in the control group 
(CTL), the treatment group (TRT), those off-support and therefore excluded from the 
analysis (OS) and the full sample (TOT) are give in the left hand columns along with the 
sample period. ATT estimates and t-statistics signifying statistical significance less than 0.05 
are shown in bold.  
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Table 2. Regression Models of the Impact of Strategic Shareholdings on ESG 
Performance 
  INT TRT MC ROE TQ LEV N R2 
Close ENV 27.73 -3.963 0.525 -0.007 -0.150 0.0886 17744 0.404 
2002-10  (6.94) (5.43) (35.50) (0.60) (8.00) (6.26)   
 SOC 26.13 -4.733 0.565 0.0144 -0.113 0.0727 17744 0.394 
  (2.60) (6.55) (40.53) (1.29) (6.22) (5.26)   
 GOV 53.01 -7.065 0.228 -0.013 -0.031 0.0394 17744 0.664 
  (5.93) (13.26) (23.90) (1.65) (2.37) (4.45)   
Strategic ENV 25.52 -3.284 0.546 -0.007 -0.149 0.0904 14935 0.410 
2005-10  (6.30) (4.36) (35.62) (0.61) (7.73) (6.13)   
 SOC 24.74 -3.327 0.573 0.0105 -0.109 0.0831 14935 0.403 
  (2.37) (4.71) (39.82) (0.89) (5.82) (5.81)   
 GOV 59.44 -5.007 0.238 -0.009 -0.037 0.0383 14935 0.675 
  (5.73) (9.81) (23.93) (1.17) (2.79) (4.18)   
Family ENV 26.50 -3.385 0.533 -0.003 -0.153 0.0892 18384 0.405 
2002-10  (6.09) (3.54) (36.31) (0.23) (8.26) (6.36)   
 SOC 24.07 -3.608 0.573 0.0165 -0.113 0.0753 18384 0.395 
  (2.28) (3.84) (41.65) (1.49) (6.35) (5.49)   
 GOV 49.13 -4.623 0.245 -0.007 -0.034 0.0433 18384 0.655 
  (5.01) (6.89) (25.36) (0.91) (2.60) (4.86)   
Corp. ENV 27.79 -6.965 0.528 -0.002 -0.147 0.0890 18384 0.407 
2002-10  (7.10) (5.66) (35.95) (0.15) (7.97) (6.38)   
 SOC 25.13 -6.455 0.567 0.0175 -0.108 0.0753 18384 0.397 
  (2.45) (5.72) (41.15) (1.58) (6.05) (5.51)   
 GOV 49.89 -6.496 0.240 -0.006 -0.029 0.0440 18384 0.656 
  (5.32) (7.52) (24.89) (0.77) (2.22) (4.89)   
Gov. ENV 25.57 5.662 0.531 -0.002 -0.153 0.0912 18384 0.404 
2002-10  (6.27) (2.93) (35.82) (0.14) (8.26) (6.48)   
 SOC 23.08 5.916 0.570 0.0177 -0.113 0.0774 18384 0.394 
  (2.26) (2.80) (41.09) (1.59) (6.35) (5.61)   
 GOV 47.77 2.003 0.245 -0.006 -0.035 0.0461 18384 0.652 
  (5.10) (1.14) (24.88) (0.77) (2.68) (5.10)   
Invest. ENV 22.61 1.515 0.555 -0.004 -0.153 0.0918 14935 0.409 
2005-10  (5.52) (2.06) (36.41) (0.37) (7.92) (6.21)   
 SOC 21.77 1.562 0.582 0.0135 -0.113 0.0845 14935 0.401 
  (2.06) (2.27) (40.52) (1.13) (6.03) (5.87)   
 GOV 55.35 1.681 0.250 -0.006 -0.044 0.0408 14935 0.670 
  (5.24) (3.54) (24.65) (0.67) (3.24) (4.36)   
Equation 2: ESGit = b0 +b1TRTit +b2MCit + b3ROEit + b4TQit + b5LEVit +… 
 YR!it y + CO!itc + IND!iti + eit 
The table reports the average impact of strategic holdings where the ownership treatment 
dummy (TRT) is defined as closely held (Close) or strategic (Strategic) equity holdings greater 
than 20% and equity holdings of greater than 10% for the components: corporations (Corp.), 
family holdings (Family), government (Gov.) and investment institutions’ (Inv.). The model is 
estimated with market capitalization (MC), profitability (ROE), Tobin’s Q (TQ) and leverage 
(LEV) controls plus (unreported) dummies to control for year, industry and country. Standard 
errors are adjusted for firm specific clustering and where the treatment variable is significant at 
5% the coefficient and t-statistic are in bold 
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Table 3. Propensity Score Matching Test of ESG Theme Performance 
  Close Strategic Corp. Family Gov. Inv. 
Theme Benefit Diff T-stat Diff T-stat Diff T-stat Diff T-stat Diff T-stat Diff T-stat 
-1.245 -5.010 -2.671 -9.160 0.016 0.050 -4.321 -10.410 9.901 12.730 -4.563 -14.630 Emission 
Reduction 
Ext. 
 -0.904 -2.410 -1.319 -3.380 -1.980 -4.490 -3.036 -6.430 -0.382 -0.260 -0.070 -0.160 
-0.850 -3.360 -2.297 -7.490 -1.391 -4.460 -1.955 -4.630 2.827 3.500 -2.041 -6.190 Product 
Innovation 
Con. 
 -0.371 -0.970 -1.177 -2.870 -1.756 -3.760 -0.666 -1.300 -1.995 -1.240 0.194 0.420 
-1.073 -3.630 -2.629 -7.780 0.197 0.540 -4.297 -8.700 11.503 12.470 -4.428 -12.230 Resource 
Reduction 
Ext. 
 -1.477 -3.290 -1.900 -4.130 -2.422 -4.690 -4.113 -6.970 0.698 0.420 0.203 0.390 
-2.149 -14.930 -1.812 -11.040 -1.645 -9.210 -3.226 -13.400 4.242 9.340 -0.536 -3.020 Community 
 
Ext. 
 -0.493 -2.290 -1.224 -5.470 -1.351 -5.270 -2.689 -9.280 1.153 1.360 0.141 0.560 
-3.033 -15.530 -2.354 -10.240 -2.032 -8.340 -3.538 -10.760 6.211 10.110 -1.509 -6.090 Diversity & 
Opportunity 
Con. 
 -0.726 -2.480 -1.146 -3.740 -1.700 -4.630 -2.715 -6.970 -0.333 -0.250 -0.876 -2.620 
-1.697 -12.620 -0.251 -1.620 -0.465 -2.780 -1.128 -5.000 5.052 11.980 -0.111 -0.670 Employment 
Quality 
Con. 
 -0.711 -3.520 -1.087 -5.150 -1.174 -4.750 -1.565 -5.600 0.803 1.080 0.045 0.190 
-2.854 -13.350 -1.756 -7.250 -2.038 -7.680 -2.776 -7.740 7.290 10.830 -0.192 -0.740 Health & 
Safety 
Con. 
 -1.041 -3.240 -1.369 -4.170 -2.167 -5.650 -2.415 -5.500 0.068 0.050 0.576 1.580 
-1.057 -6.670 -0.810 -4.310 -0.358 -1.820 -0.548 -2.060 4.902 9.920 -1.733 -8.600 Human  
Rights 
Ext. 
 -1.170 -4.840 -1.284 -5.090 -1.815 -6.480 -1.092 -3.320 -0.390 -0.390 0.313 1.090 
-0.591 -4.570 -0.920 -6.210 0.016 0.100 -1.592 -7.380 3.977 9.910 -0.980 -6.150 Product 
Responsibility 
Con. 
 -0.514 -2.670 -0.492 -2.470 -0.706 -2.960 -1.524 -5.810 -0.034 -0.040 -0.183 -0.830 
-0.270 -1.110 0.744 2.620 1.508 4.980 -0.435 -1.060 12.262 16.070 -3.596 -11.850 Training & 
Development 
Con. 
 -1.025 -2.780 -1.293 -3.340 -1.624 -3.690 -2.494 -4.800 0.627 0.470 -0.295 -0.690 
-11.347 -46.230 -2.723 -9.310 -9.876 -31.480 -3.997 -9.170 -3.613 -4.370 10.374 34.340 Board 
Function 
Int. 
 -2.005 -5.340 -1.662 -4.120 -1.629 -3.380 -1.770 -3.360 -2.110 -1.610 0.481 1.200 
-5.920 -31.750 -0.720 -3.320 -5.399 -23.100 -1.705 -5.310 0.648 1.060 6.388 28.230 Board 
Structure 
Int. 
 -1.035 -3.670 -0.857 -2.870 -1.149 -3.080 -1.602 -3.990 0.051 0.050 0.760 2.530 
-8.371 -40.160 -1.222 -4.880 -7.339 -27.810 -1.475 -4.040 -0.964 -1.390 8.531 32.940 Compensation 
Policy 
Int. 
 -0.955 -3.000 -0.989 -2.850 -0.965 -2.320 -0.881 -2.010 -1.084 -0.980 0.146 0.430 
Shareholder Int. -4.268 -33.610 -2.346 -16.410 -3.650 -22.890 -2.205 -10.100 -2.559 -6.210 3.088 20.180 
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-4.268 -33.610 -2.346 -16.410 -3.650 -22.890 -2.205 -10.100 -2.559 -6.210 3.088 20.180 
Rights  -1.603 -8.310 -1.450 -7.420 -0.726 -3.260 -0.690 -2.510 -1.274 -1.540 -0.096 -0.430 
-0.923 -3.780 -1.300 -4.470 0.741 2.440 -3.077 -7.510 11.929 15.680 -4.585 -14.770 Vision & 
Strategy 
 
Unclass. -1.182 -3.180 -1.524 -3.910 -1.938 -4.390 -3.532 -2.370 0.762 0.480 0.333 0.770 
Table 3 contains the results of propensity score matching to evaluate the impact of ownership on ESG performance. For each investment category we 
report the difference in performance between treated and untreated firms and the t-statistic of the difference in means in the first row and the 
difference in performance between matched firms and the t-statistic of the difference in means (the average treatment effect) in the second row. The 
statistical method is as described in table 1. Where the treatment effect is statistically significant the difference and t-statistic is in bold type. The 
definitions of the treatment variables and the statistical method are as described in table 1. The first 3 dimensions are classified by ASSET4 as 
environmental, the next six as social and the final five are classified as governance. Our classification is reported in the second column where external 
(EXT.), contact (Con.) and Internal (Int.) and is based on our analysis as to whether the benefits fall outside the firm, on the firm’s contacts and 
employees or on the internal management of the firm. Vision and Strategy is unclassified. The definitions of each category are given in appendix one.  
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Figure 1. PSM Estimates of the Impact of Strategic Ownership Categories on ESG Themes. 
Themes benefitting external stakeholders are shown in black, those benefitting business contacts in grey and those impacting  
on internal governance in white. Vision and strategy is the last bar, also shown in grey. Theme definitions are given in appendix one. 
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 Appendix 1. ASSET4 Theme Descriptions  
ENV Environmental Performance Pillar  
RR Resource Reduction  
The resource reduction category measures a company‘s management 
commitment and effectiveness towards achieving an efficient use of 
natural resources in the production process. It reflects a company‘s 
capacity to reduce the use of materials, energy or water, and to find 
more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain management.  
EXT 
ER Emission Reduction  
The emission reduction category measures a company‘s management 
commitment and effectiveness towards reducing environmental 
emission in the production and operational processes. It reflects a 
company‘s capacity to reduce air emissions (greenhouse gases, F- 
gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx and SOx, etc.), waste, 
hazardous waste, water discharges, spills or its impacts on biodiversity 
and to partner with environmental organizations to reduce the 
environmental impact of the company in the local or broader 
community.  
EXT 
PI Product Innovation  
The product innovation category measures a company‘s management 
commitment and effectiveness towards supporting the research and 
development of eco-efficient products or services. It reflects a 
company‘s capacity to reduce the environmental costs and burdens for 
its customers, and thereby creating new market opportunities through 
new environmental technologies and processes or eco-designed, 
dematerialized products with extended durability.  
CON 
SOC Social Performance Pillar  
EQ Employment Quality  
The workforce / employment quality category measures a company‘s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards providing high-
quality employment benefits and job conditions. It reflects a 
company‘s capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and productivity 
by distributing rewarding and fair employment benefits, and by 
focusing on long-term employment growth and stability by promoting 
from within, avoiding lay-offs and maintaining relations with trade 
unions.  
CON 
HS Health and Safety  
The workforce / health and safety category measures a company‘s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards providing a 
healthy and safe workplace. It reflects a company‘s capacity to increase 
its workforce loyalty and productivity by integrating into its day-to-day 
operations a concern for the physical and mental health, well being and 
stress level of all employees.  
CON 
TD Training and Development  
The workforce / training and development category measures a 
company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
providing training and development (education) for its workforce. It 
reflects a company‘s capacity to increase its intellectual capital, 
workforce loyalty and productivity by developing the workforce‘s 
skills, competences, employability and careers in an entrepreneurial 
environment.  
CON 
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DO Diversity and Opportunity  
The workforce / diversity and opportunity category measures a 
company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
maintaining diversity and equal opportunities in its workforce. It 
reflects a company‘s capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and 
productivity by promoting an effective life-work balance, a family 
friendly environment and equal opportunities regardless of gender, age, 
ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation.  
CON 
HR Human Rights  
The society / human rights category measures a company‘s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards respecting the 
fundamental human rights conventions. It reflects a company‘s 
capacity to maintain its license to operate by guaranteeing the freedom 
of association and excluding child, forced or compulsory labour.  
EXT 
CO Community  
The society / community category measures a company‘s management 
commitment and effectiveness towards maintaining the company‘s 
reputation within the general community (local, national and global). It 
reflects a company‘s capacity to maintain its license to operate by being 
a good citizen (donations of cash, goods or staff time, etc.), protecting 
public health (avoidance of industrial accidents, etc.) and respecting 
business ethics (avoiding bribery and corruption, etc.).  
EXT 
PR Customer / Product Responsibility  
The customer / product responsibility category measures a company‘s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards creating value-
added products and services upholding the customer‘s security. It 
reflects a company‘s capacity to maintain its license to operate by 
producing quality goods and services integrating the customer‘s health 
and safety, and preserving its integrity and privacy also through 
accurate product information and labelling.  
CON 
GOV Corporate Governance Pillar  
BS Board Structure  
The board of directors / board structure category measures a 
company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
following best practice corporate governance principles related to a 
well-balanced membership of the board. It reflects a company‘s 
capacity to ensure a critical exchange of ideas and an independent 
decision-making process through an experienced, diverse and 
independent board.  
INT 
CP Compensation Policy  
The board of directors / compensation policy category measures a 
company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
following best practice corporate governance principles related to 
competitive and proportionate management compensation. It reflects a 
company‘s capacity to attract and retain executives and board members 
with the necessary skills by linking their compensation to individual or 
company-wide financial or extra- financial targets.  
INT 
BF Board Functions  
The board of directors / board functions category measures a 
company‘s management commitment and effectiveness towards 
following best practice corporate governance principles related to 
INT 
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board activities and functions. It reflects a company‘s capacity to have 
an effective board by setting up the essential board committees with 
allocated tasks and responsibilities.  
SR Shareholder Rights  
The shareholders / shareholder rights category measures a company‘s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards following best 
practice corporate governance principles related to a shareholder policy 
and equal treatment of shareholders. It reflects a company‘s capacity to 
be attractive to minority shareholders by ensuring them equal rights 
and privileges and by limiting the use of anti-takeover devices.  
INT 
VS Vision and Strategy  
The integration / vision and strategy category measures a company‘s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of an 
overarching vision and strategy integrating financial and extra-financial 
aspects. It reflects a company‘s capacity to convincingly show and 
communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), social and 
environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making 
processes.  
n/a 
The definitions are taken from ASSET4 descriptions of their themes. The categorisation 
of each theme as internal (INT), external (EXT) or relating to business practices or 
business contacts (CON) is our judgemental assessment. We do not classify vision and 
strategy as it is unclear where the costs and benefits might fall. 
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Appendix 2. Sample Description 
Panel 1. Distribution over years 
Year Freq. ENV SOC GOV  
2002 913 47.60 48.95 51.92  
2003 927 48.00 49.19 51.73  
2004 1,706 47.96 49.31 52.25  
2005 2,117 48.34 49.15 51.77  
2006 2,133 48.38 49.15 51.95  
2007 2,301 49.81 50.11 52.21  
2008 2,682 50.20 49.84 52.92  
2009 3,024 50.25 49.61 53.07  
2010 2,887 50.57 49.68 54.43  
Total 18,690 49.36 49.53 52.68  
      
Panel 2. Distribution by Industry 
Sector Freq. ENV SOC GOV  
Unknown 12 21.34 25.10 26.04  
Basic Industries 2,106 57.23 51.09 51.26  
Capital Goods 2,365 63.76 55.94 49.13  
Consumer Durables 591 65.45 57.43 48.10  
Consumer Non-
Durables 1,282 51.59 54.00 52.03  
Consumer Services 2,683 40.31 45.81 50.99  
Energy 1,329 45.70 47.84 62.35  
Finance 3,964 39.03 43.09 51.43  
Health Care 1,102 45.54 50.94 56.17  
Public Utilities 1,123 61.55 60.01 57.43  
Technology 1,500 48.15 47.62 59.08  
Transportation 613 49.41 47.79 41.65  
Total 18,690 49.37 49.54 52.69  
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Panel 3. Distribution by Country. 
Country Freq. ENV SOC GOV  
Australia 895 41.55 40.84 58.50  
Austria 141 48.66 48.55 27.68  
Belgium 194 52.81 47.97 44.55  
Brazil 119 56.65 70.30 27.12  
Canada 1,079 36.19 36.62 70.51  
China 136 33.55 36.91 22.56  
Colombia 8 36.63 43.29 29.15  
Czech Republic 12 53.60 63.76 30.13  
Canada 45 38.42 36.58 63.81  
Denmark 173 51.22 46.26 26.87  
Finland 188 70.49 64.90 52.62  
France 674 74.76 75.49 50.55  
Germany 565 65.41 65.59 30.49  
Greece 174 48.54 51.08 19.23  
Hong Kong 487 33.29 36.21 25.11  
India 104 52.96 62.00 26.77  
Ireland 118 42.63 41.35 59.17  
Italy 365 49.21 60.34 33.88  
Japan 2,634 60.75 43.91 11.51  
Netherlands 251 66.57 74.74 62.23  
Norway 181 53.77 57.30 49.19  
Philippines 14 35.75 40.15 24.73  
Singapore 266 32.53 34.28 35.75  
South Korea 134 62.07 54.54 16.25  
Spain 348 67.27 72.89 43.93  
Sweden 405 62.55 61.27 48.68  
Switzerland 428 58.03 56.34 49.20  
Taiwan 105 47.71 38.77 12.01  
United Kingdom 2,230 58.68 62.99 68.38  
USA 6,217 38.48 43.22 72.96  
Total 18,690 49.36 49.53 52.68  
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Appendix 3. Correlation Matrices and Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables. 
              
 ENV SOC GOV Close Strategic Com. Emp. Gov. Inv. LEV ROE TQ MC 
ENV 1.000             
SOC 0.752 1.000            
GOV 0.132 0.303 1.000           
Close -0.031 -0.082 -0.411 1.000          
Strategic -0.080 -0.051 -0.165 0.494 1.000         
Com. 0.010 -0.014 -0.287 0.401 0.504 1.000        
Emp. -0.073 -0.057 -0.120 0.256 0.310 -0.022 1.000       
Gov. 0.101 0.111 -0.028 0.144 0.172 -0.011 -0.040 1.000      
Inv. -0.116 -0.065 0.274 -0.110 0.154 -0.212 -0.082 -0.086 1.000     
LEV 0.124 0.131 0.038 -0.059 -0.027 -0.026 -0.041 0.054 -0.005 1.000    
ROE 0.029 0.127 0.135 -0.036 0.036 -0.003 0.039 0.024 0.010 -0.026 1.000   
TQ -0.011 0.089 0.227 -0.091 0.018 -0.083 0.075 -0.049 0.151 -0.242 0.467 1.000  
MC 0.336 0.417 0.190 -0.096 -0.060 -0.020 -0.086 0.108 -0.066 0.092 0.250 0.055 1.000 
              
Mean 49.358 49.529 52.678 0.477 0.411 0.194 0.095 0.024 0.307 50.392 50.497 50.497 50.498 
Std. Dev. 31.985 30.880 29.999 0.499 0.492 0.395 0.293 0.153 0.461 29.041 28.867 28.867 28.867 
p25 17.170 19.820 23.770 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 25.000 25.000 25.000 25.000 
p50 44.425 47.320 60.560 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 50.500 50.000 50.000 50.500 
p75 83.700 79.790 78.820 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 75.000 75.000 75.000 75.000 
N 18690 18690 18690 17860 15008 18482 18482 18482 15008 18666 18663 18559 18690 
              
This table reports the descriptive statistics for, and correlations between, the ASSET4 measures of Environmental (ENV), Social (SOC) and 
Governance (GOV), the Datastream based zero-one indicators of closely held, strategic, company, employee, government and investment institution 
significant holdings plus the control variables of Leverage (LEV), Tobin’s Q (TQ), Return on Equity (ROE) and market capitalisation (MC), all 
expressed as annual percentiles. The correlations and descriptive statistics for the Strategic and Investment variables are calculated for 2005-2010. All 
other variables are calculated for 2002-10. 
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Appendix 4. Probit Models of Significant Strategic Ownership by Various 
Classifications of Equity Holders plus Debt Holders. 
 Close Strategic Com. Emp. Gov. Inv.  
        
MC -0.00520 -0.00481 -0.00161 -0.00608 0.0171 -0.00816  
 (6.33) (5.98) (1.74) (5.56) (6.96) (10.41)  
        
ROE -0.00101 -0.00172 -0.00102 0.0000 -0.00250 -0.00196  
 (1.58) (2.70) (1.38) (0.00) (1.34) (3.16)  
        
TQ 0.00208 0.00351 0.00106 0.00620 -0.00411 0.00127  
 (2.14) (3.64) (0.95) (4.33) (1.76) (1.38)  
        
LEV -0.00270 -0.00192 -0.00292 -0.00219 0.00394 0.00131  
 (3.59) (2.65) (3.32) (2.05) (1.91) (1.90)  
        
INT 0.413 0.163 -0.695 -0.730 -2.322 0.432  
 (1.18) (1.15) (1.43) (2.86) (6.37) (1.18)  
        
Country Y! Y! Y! Y! Y! Y! !
Industry Y! Y! Y! Y! Y! Y! !
Year Y! Y! Y! Y! Y! Y! !
        
N 17711 14924 18384 18364 16672 14909  
adj. R-sq 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.11 0.42 0.18  
 
Equation 1: TRTit = a0 +a1MCit + a2ROEit + a3TQit + a4LEVit +… 
YR!it y + CO!itc + IND!iti + eit 
The table reports the determinants of the treatment variable defined as closely 
held (Close) or strategic (Strategic) equity holdings greater than 20% and equity 
holdings of greater than 10% for the components: corporations (Corp.), family 
holdings (Family), government (Gov.) and investment institutions’ (Inv.). The model is 
estimated with market capitalization (MC), profitability (ROE), Tobin’s Q (TQ) and 
leverage (LEV) controls plus (unreported) dummies to control for year, industry and 
country. Standard errors are adjusted for firm specific clustering and where the 
treatment variable is significant at 5% the coefficient and t-statistic are in bold 
 
 
 
 
